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Abstract
Money laundering is a major global problem, enabling criminal organisations to hide their ill-gotten
gains and to finance further operations. Prevention of money laundering is seen as a high priority by
many governments, however detection of money laundering without prior knowledge of predicate crimes
remains a significant challenge. Previous detection systems have tended to focus on individuals, considering
transaction histories and applying anomaly detection to identify suspicious behaviour. However, money
laundering involves groups of collaborating individuals, and evidence of money laundering may only be
apparent when the collective behaviour of these groups is considered. In this paper we describe a detection
system that is capable of analysing group behaviour, using a combination of network analysis and supervised
learning. This system is designed for real-world application and operates on networks consisting of millions
of interacting parties. Evaluation of the system using real-world data indicates that suspicious activity is
successfully detected. Importantly, the system exhibits a low rate of false positives, and is therefore suitable
for use in a live intelligence environment.
Keywords: money laundering, supervised learning, network analysis, community detection, transaction
network
1. Introduction
This paper describes an automated system for
detecting money laundering groups in a financial
transaction network. This system employs a com-
bination of network analysis and supervised learn-
ing to identify suspicious behaviour indicative of
money laundering activity. The system is designed
for use in a live intelligence environment at the Aus-
tralian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre
(AUSTRAC).
Money laundering is a major global problem,
with numerous detrimental impacts on society.
Most importantly, money laundering enables organ-
ised criminal groups to flourish, leading to increased
incidents of predicate crime (i.e. crimes that gener-
ate the funds to be laundered). Moreover, signifi-
cant levels of money laundering can severely under-
mine economies and financial systems [16, 3].
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The process of money laundering involves three
main stages termed placement, layering, and inte-
gration [3]. The placement stage represents the in-
troduction of funds obtained through criminal ac-
tivities into the financial system. Typically, this
involves deposits that are spread over time and ge-
ographical locations. Once the funds have been
placed into the financial system, layering is under-
taken in order to hide the original source of the
funds. This stage include numerous transactions,
and often involves offshore accounts and complex
investment vehicles. In the final stage, integration,
funds (or equivalent value) are transferred to the
owners, often in the form of investments or tangi-
ble goods (e.g. jewellery, high-end cars, etc.).
It is clear from the three stages of money laun-
dering that a typical operation will involve multiple
transactions, conducted through a variety of dif-
ferent channels, by a group of parties (individuals,
businesses, etc.) acting in collusion [11, 9, 4]. How-
ever, existing systems tend to focus on individual
parties, considering individual transaction histories
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and applying anomaly detection to identify suspi-
cious behaviour (e.g. [26, 14, 25, 19, 12]). In this
paper, we describe a system that advances the cur-
rent state-of-the-art in this area, considering the
collective behaviour of small groups represented as
communities in a transaction network.
1.1. Summary of Contribution
The system described in this paper represents
an end-to-end solution for automated detection of
money laundering activity. The system is designed
to run as an ongoing monitoring tool in a live en-
vironment and is expected to analyse millions of
transactions. This includes the construction of a
network model representing relationships derived
from financial records held by AUSTRAC, extrac-
tion of meaningful communities from this network,
generation of features capturing the key characteris-
tics of these communities, and finally, classification
using a supervised learning approach. The major
novelty of this system stems from two main consid-
erations.
• Network analysis combining financial
transactions and supplementary rela-
tionships. The network analysed by our
system contains multiple relationships, repre-
sented using typed edges. In addition to the ac-
tual remittance of funds, parties may be linked
by shared accounts, shared use of agents, over-
lapping geolocations, etc. In determining the
strength of a connection between two parties,
different types of relationships are weighted to
reflect perceived importance. This allows busi-
ness knowledge to be incorporated into the net-
work model.
• Treatment of near-k-step neighbour-
hoods as observations for supervised
classifiers. Comparable systems described in
the literature have focused on individual par-
ties, typically analysing each partys transac-
tion history in isolation. Our system consid-
ers groups of transacting parties as the basic
unit of analysis, extending the notion of ‘know
your customer’ to a network setting. As we
describe in Section 3.2, groups of tightly in-
teracting parties may be extracted from a net-
work in different ways. We have elected to use
a bottom up approach for this task, extracting
relevant parties from a small region centred on
each new transaction. This approach is par-
ticularly suited to the operational needs of a
near-real-time intelligence environment.
In the following sections we describe previous
work in this area, provide an overview of our sys-
tem and evaluate its performance. Results of this
evaluation demonstrate the ability of our system to
identify suspicious behaviour in real data.
2. Related Work
One of the earliest systems for detection of money
laundering is that described by Senator [21], which
applied rule-based evaluation to identify suspicious
parties. The rules used by this system were derived
from expert knowledge and encoded in an evalu-
ation module that was run each time the target
database was updated. Parties matching these rules
would then be further investigated by analysts us-
ing an interactive query interface and a variety of
visualisation tools provided by the system. More
recently, Wang et al. describe an alternative rules-
based system, where rules are encoded using a de-
cision tree [23].
While rule-based systems may be highly accu-
rate, they are dependent on expert knowledge, and
cannot be used to uncover new typologies (i.e.
modes of operation). Later systems address this is-
sue by applying more flexible approach based on a
combination of supervised and unsupervised learn-
ing. Many of these systems follow a basic premise,
first set out by Kingdon [12], which centres on
the notion of know your customer and the use of
anomaly detection for identifying money launder-
ing behaviour.
In these systems, two main contexts are consid-
ered for deriving models of normal, non-suspicious
behaviour. The first context is provided by the
transaction history for a given party, while the sec-
ond context is provided by sets of parties exhibiting
similar behaviour. In the original system described
by Kingdon, grouping of parties into related sets
was based on a small number of superficial features
such as the use of similar banking products, or sets
of businesses providing the same service. Later sys-
tems have greatly improved on this scheme, apply-
ing distance-based clustering across a far broader
range of features (e.g. [26, 14, 25, 19]).
In contrast to an anomaly detection approach,
a number of systems apply supervised learning to
identify suspicious behaviour [17, 10]. In general,
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these systems are expected to provide a higher de-
gree of precision than those based on anomaly de-
tection, since anomalous behaviour does not neces-
sarily translate to money laundering activity. How-
ever, unlike those systems based on anomaly de-
tection, these systems can only identify suspicious
behaviour that is similar to that observed in previ-
ous investigations.
To date, the majority of systems reported in the
literature have focused on individual parties, con-
sidering amounts transacted, frequency of transac-
tions, etc. However, more recent studies have be-
gun to adopt a network-based approach, consider-
ing features derived from the structure of a trans-
action network.
For example, the system described in [7] uses role
assignment to augment a more traditional approach
based on anomaly detection (described in [6]). Us-
ing bank statements, a social network is constructed
with parties linked by transactions. For each party
in the network a number of invariants (betweenness
centrality, page rank, etc.) are calculated. A role is
then assigned to the party depending on the values
of these invariants. Examples of roles include insu-
lators, who act as a buffer between a core group of
parties and the larger network, and communicators
who act as a conduit for movement of funds be-
tween two otherwise unconnected parties. Assigned
roles are then taken into account when considering
the normality of a given parties transactions, with
parties having the same role expected to show sim-
ilarities in their transaction histories.
Taking the structural considerations even fur-
ther, the systems described in [5, 18] aim to iden-
tify subgraphs within a network that closely match
known typologies . In these systems, the use of
fuzzy matching means that subgraphs may devi-
ate in some way from the given typology, providing
greater flexibility than a simple motif search.
3. System Description
Our system performs four main tasks. (1) Mod-
elling of relationships derived from AUSTRAC data
as a typed, attributed network. (2) Extraction of
communities from the transaction network. (3) Cal-
culation of features from extracted communities,
capturing information related to transaction dy-
namics, party demographics and community struc-
ture. (4) Supervised machine learning, treating
extracted communities as observations. Figure 1
shows a high level overview of the system.
The system is designed to run on an ongoing ba-
sis, analysing new activity as it occurs. Initially,
we extract a random set of communities from the
transaction network, and combine these with a set
of known suspicious communities. This forms the
training set for our supervised learning. Having ob-
tained a trained classifier, the system is then em-
ployed for analysis of new activity. For each new
transaction reported, the initiating party is treated
as a seed and the community containing this party
is extracted from the network. Selected features
are then calculated, and the community is classi-
fied as suspicious or non-suspicious using the pre-
viously trained classifier. Those communities that
are deemed to be suspicious are then passed to in-
telligence analysts for further investigation.
3.1. Transaction Network
Our system considers two types of transactions
reported to AUSTRAC; large cash deposits and in-
ternational funds transfers. Reports provide details
of each transaction (amounts, requested currency,
etc.) and also provide additional information on
the sending or receiving parties. Information held
in these reports is modelled as a transaction net-
work, with nodes representing transacting parties
and edges representing relationships between these
parties. Both parties and transaction edges have a
number of associated attributes, including the name
and address of parties involved, total amount trans-
acted, etc. Relationships are divided into two differ-
ent types; transactions, representing direct trans-
fer of funds, and supplementary connections, rep-
resenting mutual association of parties with sup-
plementary evidence (e.g. parties who access the
same account are connected). An example network
is shown in Figure 2.
Each transaction is modelled as a set of edges
connecting sending parties with receiving parties.
Certain transactions may include multiple senders
and receivers, thus each transaction may be repre-
sented by multiple edges connecting all sending par-
ties to all receiving parties. Note that cyclic edges
are allowed, as parties may deposit cash into their
own account, or transfer funds between accounts
held in different countries.
In addition to transactions, parties may be con-
nected through relationships derived from supple-
mentary data available in some reports. These re-
lationships are represented as a weighted edge be-
tween each pair of parties associated through sup-
plementary evidence. For example, if multiple par-
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Figure 1: System overview.
ties access the same account, each party will be con-
nected to every other party accessing the account
(forming a clique). For these relationships, each
edge represents a summary of all evidence connect-
ing the parties involved. Thus each pair of associ-
ated parties is connected by a single supplementary
edge. Weights on these edges are calculated as fol-
lows.
For a given pair of parties (p, q), the strength of
their connection through evidence e is given as
wp,q,e =
n(p, e)
de
·
n(q, e)
de − n(p, e)
where n(p, e) gives the number of transactions
where party p is associated with evidence e and de
gives the total number of transactions involving
e. A weight wp,q,e can thus be interpreted as the
probability of first selecting a random party p
that is associated with e based on the number of
transactions linking p to e, and then choosing a
second party q in the same way from the remaining
set of parties associated with e. The total strength
of the connection between p and q is then taken as
the maximum weight over all evidence connecting
them.
For the purposes of this paper, we constructed
a sample network consisting of relationships ex-
tracted from reports submitted AUSTRAC in 2012.
Table 1 provides a set of summary statistics for this
network. One important characteristic is the high
number of discrete connected components. This re-
flects the fact that the transactions considered only
include international funds transfers and large cash
deposits. Domestic transactions that do not involve
large amounts of cash are not represented in the
network. Consequently, the network does not ex-
hibit the same degree of connectedness that is typ-
ically observed in social networks (see for example
[22]).
Within the sample network, a number of individ-
uals are tagged as being suspicious. These individ-
uals have previously been suspected of involvement
in money laundering operations. For the purposes
of this paper, communities containing these tagged
individuals are labelled as positive observations, as
described in Section 3.4.
3.2. Community Extraction
Evidence of money laundering involves multiple
transactions between different parties. For this rea-
son, we are interested in identifying small sets of in-
teracting parties whose collective behaviour is sus-
picious. Since our system employs supervised learn-
ing, small groups of interacting parties must be ex-
tracted from the larger network and treated as ob-
servations. There are two main-options for this,
community detection (top-down) or an ego-centric
approach (bottom-up) based on k-step neighbour-
hoods. For our particular purposes, existing com-
munity detection algorithms (see [8] for a compre-
hensive review) suffer from a number of issues, leav-
ing the ego-centric approach as the favoured option.
One limitation of existing community detection
algorithms is their inability to handle heterogeneous
networks. The vast majority of these algorithms
are designed with a single edge type and single ver-
tex type in mind. Moreover, it is difficult to inject
business knowledge into existing approaches, as any
attributes of the edges and vertices are typically ig-
nored (however see [24]). While both of these issues
can be addressed to some extent through weight-
ing of edges, it can be difficult to combine infor-
mation held in numerous attributes and numerous
edge types into a single meaningful weight.
Another drawback of existing methods is that
they often result in excessively large communities
[15, 13]. In general, meaningful communities are
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Figure 2: Example network consisting of four parties linked by transactions and supplementary evidence. Network A shows the
individual transactions (solid edges) and supplementary relationships (dashed edges) connecting the four parties. Network B
shows the same four parties with multiple transactions and multiple supplementary relationships summarised as a single edge
of each type. Party colours indicate different countries.
Table 1: Summary statistics for sample transaction network.
Network Statistics
vertex type parties
edge types transactions, associations
parties 20, 854, 744
total edges 39, 283, 144
supplementary edges 7, 674, 102
transaction edges 31, 609, 042
connected components 4, 654, 162
parties in largest component 11, 650, 339
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thought to contain less than 150 individuals [15, 2],
and published typologies indicate that investiga-
tion of money laundering operations often focuses
on a relatively small number of key parties [4].
Using traditional community detection algorithms,
smaller communities tend to be found only at the
extremities of a network [15, 13]. Typically, these
communities consist of entities that have only re-
cently been added to the network. However, within
the core of the network, where the vast majority of
interactions take place, many of the detected com-
munities are exceedingly large. For this reason, we
take an ego-centric approach, building communities
as a bottom-up process.
Given the limitations of community detection, we
define communities in our system as near-k-step
neighbourhoods. A k-step neighbourhood is ob-
tained by selecting a subject party p0 (also referred
to as the seed) and all parties having a distance of k
or less from this seed (i.e. there is a path from the
subject p0 to the candidate party p containing k or
less edges). The subgraph induced by these parties
is the k-step neighbourhood. We say near-k-step, as
two additional constraints are applied beyond that
imposed by k. These additional constraints further
limit the parties and relationships included in the
neighbourhood.
The first constraint is controlled by a parame-
ter, Nmax, which gives the maximum number of
transaction neighbours for a party (i.e. the maxi-
mum number of parties that have conducted at least
one transaction with the subject). Parties having
a number of neighbours that exceeds this threshold
are treated as gates. Unless linked to other parties
within the k-step neighbourhood, the transaction
neighbours of these parties are not included in the
community. This allows us to handle situations,
for example, where many parties have transacted
with a large corporation but are otherwise unre-
lated. The second parameter, wmin, gives the mini-
mum weight for supplementary edges to be included
in the community. Note that each of these parame-
ters may be specified as a vector of dimension k, so
that constraints may vary with distance from the
subject party. Figure 3 provides an overview of the
community detection process.
For the purposes of this paper, we consider k = 3,
Nmax = 40, and wmin = 0.01. These values are rep-
resentative of the actual values used in the live en-
vironment, which are selected in consultation with
domain experts. In particular our reasoning for tak-
ing k = 3 stems from the fact that vast major-
ity of transactions in the network are international
transfers. By considering 3 steps, we obtain a seed
party in the source country, associated parties in
the destination country, additional parties in the
source country transacting with these same asso-
ciates, and finally, related parties in the destination
country. In other words, setting k = 3 allows us to
obtain parties in both the source and destination
countries that are not directly associated, but are
linked through a third party.
As shown in Figure 3, extraction of communi-
ties is achieved by first splitting the network into
discrete connected components. Those components
that are below a threshold size (diameter ≤ k) are
treated as communities, with no need to extract
the near-k-step neighbourhoods. For those compo-
nents having size greater than the specified thresh-
old, near-k-step neighbourhoods are extracted for
any subject parties within the component (selec-
tion of subject parties is described in Section 3.4).
In our system, this process is implemented using a
parallel architecture, allowing millions of communi-
ties to be extracted in short period of time.
Treatment of communities as near-k-step neigh-
bourhoods can introduce a significant degree of
overlap between communities. From an intelligence
standpoint, this is a useful characteristic of our ap-
proach, as it means the classifier is exposed to nu-
merous views of the same underlying signal, placed
within a different context. When assessing a new
community, training in this way will mean that the
classifier is able to correctly identify suspicious ac-
tivity even if it is only seeing a small portion of
the relevant transactions. One drawback however,
is that multiple overlapping communities may be
classified as suspicious, and steps must be taken so
that analysts are not presented with large numbers
of highly similar networks.
For example, suppose that two transactions occur
within a short time frame, and that these transac-
tions involve parties whose distance from one an-
other in the network is less than three. For each
transaction, a community is extracted using the
sending party as the seed. However, since the par-
ties involved are less than three steps from each
other, the resulting communities will overlap. If
both of these communities are classified as suspi-
cious then without intervention they would both
be passed to an analyst (or to two different ana-
lysts) for further investigation. Clearly this situa-
tion is undesirable, thus a post-processing step is
employed that evaluates the degree of overlap be-
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Figure 3: Overview of community extraction process.
tween communities deemed to be suspicious. If the
overlap is above a certain threshold, then the union
of the communities is taken, and it is this result
that will be passed to the analyst.
3.3. Features
Our system considers a broad range of features
derived from the extracted communities. Design
of this feature set was guided by expert knowledge
(AUSTRAC, unpublished data), and a broad sur-
vey of literature related to detection of criminal be-
haviour and to general network analysis. This fea-
ture set is designed to represent different aspects of
the transaction network, with features divided into
four main categories, as shown in Table 2.
Calculation of dynamic features includes the use
of burst analysis, which provides an indication of
transaction regularity and is used to identify ab-
normal behaviour. A wavelet-based algorithm was
used for this, which has previously been shown to
outperform alternative algorithms in detecting both
local and global bursts (Wang, in press).
3.4. Supervised Learning
Our system is designed to allow a high-degree of
flexibility in the use of different machine learning
models. Given the adversarial nature of the prob-
lem domain, and the resulting potential for concept
drift, it is important that classifiers are regularly
re-evaluated. As notions of suspicious and non-
suspicious change over time, new classifiers may
need to be trained. In general, this training will in-
clude model selection and parameter optimisation.
However, for the purposes of this paper, we limit
consideration to a support vector machine (SVM)
and a random forest, as implemented in the R li-
braries e1071 and randomForest, respectively. For
the SVM we considered a linear and polynomial
kernel, using default values for the respective pa-
rameters. For the random forest we set the number
of trees to one hundred and used default values for
all other parameters.
Since the total number of communities that could
be extracted from the transaction network is ex-
tremely large, training and evaluation was under-
taken using a sample of the full set. This sampling,
and the assignment of labels, was undertaken as
follows. For the labelled true positives we took
all parties marked as suspicious in the available
database. For each of these parties, we then iden-
tified their neighbours in the transaction network
and combined these to form a set of positive sub-
jects. For the labelled true negatives, we took a
random sample of 700, 000 subjects from those par-
ties not used as subjects for true positives. Near-
k-neighbourhoods were then extracted for each of
the positive and negative subjects. Resulting com-
munities were then assigned the same label as their
subject. Note that in certain situations, this pro-
cess can result in duplicate communities, thus a
post-processing step was employed to remove these
duplicates.
To obtain a robust estimate of classifier perfor-
mance, we employed a method similar to k-fold
cross validation. In each of the k evaluations we
took the full set of positive labelled communities,
and combined this with the same number of com-
munities randomly sampled from the full set of neg-
ative communities. For each of the k iterations, the
resulting set was randomly partitioned into train-
ing and evaluation sets, with 70% of the obser-
vations used for training and 30% used for eval-
uation. In each iteration the F-score was calcu-
lated using three values for the weighting factor,
β1 = 0.1, β2 = 0.5, β3 = 1. These values were se-
lected as we are interested in the ability of the clas-
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Table 2: Feature categories.
category description
Demographic Aggregate features describing parties in the network (e.g.
mean age)
Network Invariants describing the network structure (e.g. transitiv-
ity)
Transaction Aggregations over transactions included in the community
(e.g. total cash amount)
Dynamic Features derived from time-series analysis (e.g. num. un-
usually high amounts)
sifier to achieve a high-precision. An ROC curve
was also calculated in each iteration and a param-
eter τ was determined from this curve giving the
threshold value for classifier scores that maximised
the F-score for a given value of β. Precision and re-
call were then calculated for this value of τ . Mean
performance in F-score, precision, recall and area
under the ROC curve was then calculated across
the k iterations.
4. Evaluation
4.1. Community Extraction
After removing duplicates, a total of 758, 271
communities were extracted from the network. Fig-
ure 4 shows the distribution of size (number of par-
ties) for extracted communities. Additional statis-
tics are provided in Table 3. As shown in Figure
4, the vast majority of extracted communities have
more than 5 and less than 50 parties.
4.2. Results of Supervised Learning
Table 4 gives the mean performance for a set of
classifiers evaluated using the sampling process de-
scribed in Section 3.4, taking k = 10. Example
ROC curves are shown for a classifier of each model
type. The results shown in Table 1 and Figure 5 in-
dicate that both the random forest and SVM classi-
fiers are able to achieve a level of performance that
is suitable for use in a live environment. The ran-
dom forest gives slightly better performance.
While the average recall of the classifiers is quite
low, both models exhibit an extremely high preci-
sion. This means that a high classification thresh-
old (τ) can be selected, so that the classifier can
operate with low rates of false positives. This is
an important characteristic for real-world applica-
tion of our system, as any communities classified
as suspicious will be further investigated by human
false positive rate
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Figure 5: ROC curve for random forest and SVM classifiers.
analysts. Since this is a time-consuming task, only
minimal levels of false-negatives can be tolerated.
5. Future Work
The system described in this paper provides a
basic framework for identifying money laundering
activity in a transaction network. It is intended
that future work will extend and improve this basic
framework, informed by feedback provided from its
use in an actual financial intelligence environment.
One limitation of our system is that network
structure is represented solely through graph in-
variants. Moreover, the particular invariants used
can only describe the global structure of each com-
munity. It may be that more localised descriptors,
such as the role assignment proposed in [7], pro-
vide a more informative view. In addition, our sys-
tem considers the dynamics of each community only
through analysis of transaction time-series. Future
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work will also consider the evolution of the commu-
nity structure over time, and will attempt to cap-
ture relationships between the structure and par-
ticular edge and and vertex attributes.
Another limitation of our system is the reliance
on expert knowledge for setting parameter values
(e.g. thresholds imposed during community extrac-
tion). Future work will consider the sensitivity of
our system to these values, and the use of auto-
mated approaches for determining optimal values.
Since our system uses supervised learning, it is
unable to discover new typologies. To address this
issue, future work will also consider unsupervised
approaches. In particular, the use of network-based
anomaly detection will be considered (see [20, 1] for
recent reviews).
6. Conclusions
We have described an automated system for de-
tecting money laundering operations in transaction
networks. This system advances the current state-
of-the-art by analysing both explicit transaction re-
lationships and implicit relationships derived from
from supplementary information. The system ex-
tracts small, meaningful communities from this net-
work in manner that allows existing business knowl-
edge to be considered in the process. Supervised
learning is then applied to these communities to
obtain trained classifiers. Evaluation of the system
shows that a suitable level of accuracy is achieved
at high levels of precision. This is an important
characteristic for our system, as use in a live envi-
ronment necessitates a low rate of false positives.
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Table 3: Community statistics.
total positive 69, 328 (all positive)
total negative 688, 943 (random sample)
mean num. parties 33
mean num. supplementary relation-
ships
47
mean num. transactions 124
mean diameter 3.5
Table 4: Mean performance of random forest classifiers over ten samples. Each random forest consisted of 100 trees. Parameters
β and τ refer to the weighting used in the calculation of F-scores and threshold used for classification, respectively.
model AUC β τ F-score recall precision
random forest 0.92 0.1 0.93 0.96 0.31 0.98
0.5 0.68 0.86 0.73 0.90
1.0 0.47 0.85 0.88 0.82
SVM 0.86 0.1 0.89 0.90 0.22 0.93
0.5 0.63 0.80 0.70 0.83
1.0 0.32 0.80 0.87 0.74
